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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITYOFOREM,
Petitioner/Appellant,

:
:

v.

:

RAJIBARBIR,

:

Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 20040179-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3. Addendum [hereinafter "Add."].
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1. Pursuant to Rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure the City of Orem
respectfully prays the Utah Court of Appeals certify this appeal to tl;> - ;.i>i NI;=-I'VI" •' >nrt
to review State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) and State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d
911,916 (Utah 1998) rulings and entertain the City of Orem's request to overrule Viles and
Heaton and interpret Utah Code Ann.§77-29-l,et seq., in conjunction with Utah Code
Ann.§77-29-5, et seq., and in light of the ruling inFex v. Michigan. (1993). 507 U.S. 43.113

S.Ct. 1085, Croslandv. State, 219 Utah Adv. Rep.3, 857 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), and State
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 311 (Utahl975), and upon statutory construction and policy to
eliminate the two created different sets of rules governing the commencement of speedy
disposition periods for prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the same system.
2. In the alternative, the City of Orem prays the Utah Court of Appeals provide for
a "good cause" exception as listed under §77-29-1(2)-(3) by affirming that the "appropriate
prosecuting" attorney must receive actual notice, not constructive notice, and reinstate the
charges against the defendant. The City contends the Trial Court incorrectly ruled and
dismissed the charges against the appellee, pursuant to Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1, that
the City of Orem had constructive notice upon receipt by the warden/prison of the 120-day
written demand by the appellee to have his case(s), pending in Orem City and other
jurisdictions. Furthermore, "Good Cause" exists to extend and conduct the trial outside of
the 120-day requirement.

Accordingly, this Court should review the trial court's

"constructive notice" finding for correction. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah
1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL: PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
See addendum for copies of all pertinent provisions, statutes and rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 5, 2001, Orem City filed and charged, in the Fourth District Court
Orem department, the Appellee with driving on revocation, open container, and five
2

misdemeanor couiits of possession of a controlled substance. The trial coi irt judge recused
himself because of a conflict of interest and the case was transferred to the Frovo Depai11nent
and Judge Davis was assigned. Judge Davis issued a bench warrant for the defendants arrest
on April 19, 2002 for failing to appear at the pretrial conference. On or about August 19,
2002, the defendant was arrested on the warrant. The City of Orem did not receive notice
of the defendants arrest on the bench warrant and the defendant was sent to prison on other
matters.
On or about October 17, 2002, a 120-day written demand for disposition for all the
defendant's cases were delivered to the warden. The warden failed to send I he 120 day
disposition to Orem City. The 120-day disposition was sent to the Utah County Attorney's
office and the Provo District court. Neither party notified Orem City of the 120-day notice
disposition. The 120-day period expired on February 14, 2003. In April, the state prison
mailed the Court to schedule a pretrial conference, which the Court scheduled, but the Court
failed to send notice of this new pretrial conference to the City of Orem. The Court
rescheduled the hearing and the defendant was again remanded back to the custody of the
prison.
On July 22,2003, the Court sent a new notice of a pretrial conference. The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss at this pretrial conference. The Court scheduled a trial for
November 20,2003 and at that time would hear arguments from both sides. On November
20, 2003, Judge Pullen granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.
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The Appellant now appeals the trial courts dismissal of the case for failure to bring the
defendant to trial prior to the 120 day expiration. Because the chronology of the proceedings
in this matter is critical in reviewing this matter, the Statement of Facts will contain the
chronological and procedural history.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On September 5, 2001, the Orem City Attorneys office filed charges, in the
Fourth District Court, Orem Department, of five counts of possession or use
of controlled substance, driving on revocation, and possession or
transportation of an open container of alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle.
(R.at 2).

2.

On November 1, 2001, the date of arraignment, Judge Backlund recused
himself and referred the case to the Court Administrator. (R.at 4).

3.

The Court Administrator assigned the case to Judge Davis and an arraignment
was scheduled for January 23, 2002. (R.at 4).

4.

The defendant appeared late for the arraignment, on January 23,2002, and the
court recalled the warrant issued for failing to appear. (R.at 8).

5.

The Court appointed Randy Lish, the Orem City Public Defender, to represent
the defendant. (R.at 8).

6.

The Court sent notices to both the Orem City Prosecutor and the Public
Defender of the next pretrial scheduled on March 5, 2002. (R.at 6-8).
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Ofi March 5,2005, both parties requested a continuance of the pretrial and the
court granted the motion scheduling the next pretrial conference on A pr11 30,
2002. (R.at 13,14).
The defendant failed to appear on April 30, 2002, and Judge Davis issued a
$2,500, cash only bench warrant. (R.at 16
On August 19, 2002, the Defendant was arrested on the bench warrant. (R.at
77,15).

The Orem City Attorney' s office was never notified the defendant was arrested
on the Bench warrant. (R.at 75, f20).
On September 6,2002, the Defendant was sent to the Utah State Prison. (R.at
76,112).
On September 25, 2002, the defendant filed with the division of institutional
operations a notice and request for 120-day disposition of pending charges.
(R.at 30-33).
The Defendant listed on the "Division of Institutional Operations Office
Memorandum," the prosecuting agencies as "Utah County, Orem City, and
Pleasant Grove." (R.at 30-33).
On the "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charge(s)" the
defendant requested final disposition of "Possession of Controlled Substance
case #9850403 88" pending against "me" in the "Provo District" Court brought
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by "Utah County55 prosecuting agency. (R.at 31).
15.

On October 17, 2002, an authorized agent of state prison certified the notice.
(R.at 31).

16.

The 120-day disposition began to run from October 17,2002, and would have
expired on February 14, 2003. (R.at 75, f21).

17.

However, on October 15,2002, two days earlier, the Utah State Prison sent to
the Utah County Attorney's officer a letter stating "Bruce Jackson is currently
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. He/She is requesting disposition of
untried charges of driving on revocation, possession of c/s 3 cts (sic), pending
in your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his
request.55 (R.at 34).

18.

The letter listed case numbers "985040388,985039407,985041078,027J219.55
(R.at34).

19.

The Orem City case numbers were not included on the letter. (R.at 34).

20.

A copy of this letter was filed with the "Fourth District Court Clerk-Provo.55
(R.at34).

21.

The Orem City Attorney's office never received any of these notices filed by
the defendant nor had any knowledge the defendant was incarcerated. (R.at
75,119-20).

22.

Almost one year after the bench warrant was issued, on April 23, 2003,
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"Darlene" at the Utah State Prison e-mailed and requested a court date be set;
this was several months after the 120-day disposition expired (H Al Mi nute
Entry Record Page 4).
23.

The Court scheduled a pretrial conference for May 27, 2003. (R.at 22).

24.

On May 27, 2003, the Court on its own motion continued the pretrial because
the Orem City Prosecutor was not given notice of the Mm 27, 2003 IK ,II ing.
(R.at 22-24).

25.

The Court rescheduled the pretrial conference hearing for July 22,2003. (R.at
24).

26.

Judge Taylor presided over the July 22, 2003 pretrial hearin<» tin I llie
defendant's attorney requested this case be scheduled for a Motion hearing
regarding a Motion to dismiss. (R.at 26-28).

27.

The motion hearing was scheduled for September 29, 2003 (R.at26).

28.

On September 10, 2003, the defendant filed Motion JIKI MnnoMiidum to
dismiss the case. (R.at 42-44).

29.

On September 29, 2003, the defendant's attorney stated he wishes to proceed
to trial in case #014404844 and the Court set both oral argument and the date
for trial on November 20,2003. However, the issue of whether the defendant
would be forced to go to trial would be contingent upon the court granting or
denying his motion to dismiss. (R.at 43-44).
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30.

On November 20,2003, prior to the trial, Judge Derek Pullan presided over the
hearing and the Court heard Oral Arguments from both the defendant and the
City. (R.at45;Tr. Volume I of I, Pg. 14-45)

31.

At the conclusion of the oral arguments, the Court dismissed with prejudice all
counts against the defendant based upon the defendant's motion and oral
arguments. (R.at 45-47; Tr.Volume I ofIPg.42, TJ10-23.)

32.

Mr. Lish prepared the findings of facts and conclusions of law, but the Court
disagreed and prepared its own facts and legal conclusions. (R.at 70-78).

33.

In the findings of fact, the Trial Court acknowledged the City did not receive
notice of the defendant being picked up on the bench warrant or receive notice
of 120-day detainer notice. (R.at 75,^19,20).

34.

The City of Orem requested the Trial Court find good cause to extend and
conduct a trial outside of the 120-day detainer statute requirement based upon
the defendants conduct (having failed to appear at a pretrial conference and
a bench warrant being issued) and failing to receive any notice of arrest on the
warrant and/or the failure to receive the 120-day detainer notice demand. (R.at
72).

35.

The Court found this argument without merit and ruled based upon State v.
Heaton, the 120-day detainer statute requirement commenced upon the warden
receiving the defendant's notice, and thus, the City of Orem would have
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constructive notice of the defendant in State's ciistody and any administrative
mistakes made by the defendant, warden, state agency; or court \\0111 ci. not
relieve the City of their burden to bring the defendant to trial within 120-days.
(R.at 71,72).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: The City of Orem prays this Court certify for immediate transfer for decision
to the Utah Supreme Court.
Point II: The 120-day detainer statute should not begin to run until the appropriate
prosecuting agency receive actual notice of the 120-day demand for disposition.
Point III: Good cause exist to schedule and hold the trial against the appellee outside
the 120-day time period.
ARGUMENTS

I.

PURSUANT TO RULE 43 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE THE CITY OF OREM REQUESTS THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS CERTIFYTHIS CASE FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER TO THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT FOR DETERMINATION.
Pursuant to Rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure the City of Orem

requests this honorable court to certify this case for immediate transfer to the Utah Supreme
Court for determination to review and overturn the Supreme Court's rulings in Viles and
Heaton and interpret Utah Code Ann.§77-29- l,et seq. in conjunction with Utah Code
Ann.§77-29-5, et seq., and in light of Fex, Crosland, Moore, and the Taylor Courts' ruling.
9

The compelling reasons of statutory construction, policy, and need to eliminate the two
different sets of rules governing the commencement of speedy disposition periods for
prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the same system and treat the prisoners "side-by-side"
supports the City's request. The City brief sets forth the following analysis in support.
A. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THE CITY OF OREM HAD
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF DEFENDANT'S ARREST AND INCARCERATION
UPON THE DEFENDANT5 S DELIVERY TO THE WARDEN THE WRITTEN DEMAND
FOR 120-DAY DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL MATTERS PENDING IN OREM CITY
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §77-29-1.
The City of Orem appeals the trial courts decision to dismiss the charges against the
defendant and argues the trial court incorrectly ruled the City of Orem had constructive
knowledge of the defendant's incarceration, and thus, no good cause exists to extend and
conduct the trial court date beyond the 120-day detainer statute requirement. To adequately
argue the reasons against "constructive notice" a historical analysis and legal development
of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 is insightful to consider.
Article I §12 of the Utah Constitution, provides that an accused in a criminal
prosecution shall have the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. State v. Wilson,
22 Utah 2d 361; 453 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1969). In 1965, the legislature implemented that
provision of the Constitution by adopting Chapter 65 of Title 77, entitled "Disposition of
Detainers Against Prisoners." Id at 159. The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutes
stating "the purpose of these statutes is to carry into effect the constitutional guarantee of a
speedy trial and to more precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial" as the term is used
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in the constitutions of the various states. Id at 159. The Utah Supreme Court offers two
judicial interpretations of these statutes; first, to prevent those charged with enforcement of
criminal statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed of charges against him,
and second, the statute was intended to provide for the trial of charges against an accused
while witnesses are available and their memories fresh. Id at 15 9. Moreover, as early as 1969,
the burden of complying with the statute was placed upon the prosecutor. Id at 159.
However, it did not take long for the Utah Courts to be faced with the challenge and
issue of determining when the burden begins to run against the prosecution. At the time
these issues surfaced, the Utah Code Ann. §77-65-l(a)(b) in part, provided:

"...whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of
the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment,
information or complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within ninety days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the county
attorney of the county in which the indictment, information or complaint is
pending and the appropriate court written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint....
(b) the written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph
(a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, sheriff or other
official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with
the certificate to the appropriate county attorney and court by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested."(emphasis added).
In State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 311 (Utahl975), the Court answered this specific
issue of determining the "commencement of the period of computation, under the statute"
by explaining and setting forth the "sequence of events to invoke the benefits of the act."
11

538 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1975); See State v.Moore. 521 P.2d 566,557 (Utah 1974)(holding
"after further consideration and examination of the statute we conclude that the 90-day period
commences on the day the defendant notified the county attorney of his request for final
disposition of a case..."). The Court noted "First, the person incarcerated must give or send
to the warden his written notice or request for final disposition. Second, the warden in
mandatory terms is required to prepare a certificate setting forth the particulars specified in
subsection (a)." Id at 312 (emphasis added). The Court ruled, by combining subpart (a) and
subpart (b), the "statute provides that the request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a
certificate of the warden, and that these "shall promptly " be forwarded to the county attorney
and the appropriate court." Id at 312. The Court continued stating "[t]his mandatory
language plainly requires delivery to the proper court, and carries with it the concomitant
duty to diligently determine proper delivery... [and].. .since by the terms of the statute both the
notice and the certificate are required, the act of giving or sending notice and the warden's
certificate must be delivered to the county attorney and the appropriate court, before the 90day period commences to run." Id at 312-13. The Utah Supreme Court thus ruled that actual
delivery to the appropriate county attorney and appropriate court were prerequisites prior to
the commencement of the statute time frame, (emphasis added.)
Parallel to this statute, and germane to the City's argument, is the legislative adoption
of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 Article III, referred to as the "Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Agreement" or "IAD." This statute is made applicable to defendant's incarcerated in
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jurisdictions outside the state of Utah. Procedurally mirroring the Utah Code Ann. §77-65l(a)(b), Utah's IAD statute states "(a)...he (the incarcerated person) shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court...and...(b) the written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of
corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together
with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested.
Similar to the Taylor Court addressing commencement of the period under Utah Code
Ann. §77-65-l(a)-(b), the Utah Supreme Court faced the issue of determining when the
burden on the prosecutor should commence under the "IAD"- whether upon delivery to the
warden or upon delivery to the appropriate prosecuting agency. In Croslandv. State, 219
Utah Adv. Rep.3, 857 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court considered this issue
when a Utah Prosecutor did not receive the notice sent by an incarcerated detainee located
in the state of Idaho. The detainee argued he complied with the IAD by delivering the
written demand to the Idaho custodians and that the IAD protections are immediately
invoked because he has done all he can under the statute, and thus, the Utah authorities had
"de facto notice" of his desire to dispose of the Utah charges pending against him. The Utah
Supreme Court relied upon a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling ofFexv. Michigan (1993),
507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, because the "IAD" is a congressionally sanctioned interstate
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compact [and] the interpretation of which presents a question of federal law. Crosland v.
State. 219 Utah Adv. Rep.3, 857 P.2d 943, 945 n.3 (Utah 1993). The Crosland Court held
the statute only begins to run when the prosecutor receives the actual notice, not de facto
notice, of the written demand. See Id at 943.
The Crosland Court reached its decision based upon the U.S. Supreme Court of Fex,
where a prisoner, being held in Indiana, was under a detainer for charges pending in
Michigan. He gave his request for final disposition of detainer to the Indiana authorities and
the prison officials had held the request and the Michigan prosecutor did not receive the
request until 19 days later. Crosland v. State, at 946; Fex v. Michigan/19931 507 U.S. 43,
113 S.Ct. 1085. The trial began one hundred seventy-seven days after the prosecutor
received the IAD request. Id at 946. The inmate argued that the one-hundred-eighty-day
period began to run when he submitted the request to the prison officials. Id at 946. Fex also
advanced a policy argument, similar to Crosland's, based on the IAD's emphasis on the
protections of prisoner's rights. Id at 946. Fex asserted that "fairness requires the burden of
compliance with the requirements of the IAD to be placed entirely on the law enforcement
officials involved, since the prisoner has little ability to enforce compliance" and that other
approaches would "frustrate the [IAD's] higher purpose." Id at 946.
The holding in Fex addressed both issues; 1) which event triggers the one-hundredeighty-day period-receipt by the custodial officials or receipt by the prosecuting attorney, and
2) the policy argument of fairness and compliance enforcement. After a intensely focused
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examination of the statutory language (read and applied as a whole), the Fex Court held
"[indications in the text of Article III confirm, in our view, that the receiving State's receipt
of the request starts the clock. The most significant is the provision of Article 111(b)
requiring the warden to forward the prisoner's request and accompanying documents 'by
registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested.5 The IAD thus provides for
documentary evidence of the date on which the request is delivered to the officials of the
receiving state, but requires no record of the date on which it is transmitted to the
warden...[and]...another textual tool, we think, is the IAD's apparent indifference as to the
manner of transmittal to the warden: Article 111(b) says only that the request 'shall be given
or sent by the prisoner to the warden.'" Croslandv. State, at 946; Fex v. Michigan,(1993),
113 S.Ct. at 1091.(emphasis added).
The U.S. Supreme Court went on to address the fairness factor and the risk of the
malfeasance, or even malicious acts, of the prison officials must be borne by the defendant,
People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998), stating the petitioners arguments of
fairness "are more appropriately addressed to the legislatures and the contracting states,
which adopted the IAD's text" Fex v. Michigan^ 19931 113 S.Ct. at 1091, and as a policy
concern, a receiving state's prosecutors should not bear the "risk of losing their case until
they have been informed of the request for trial." Fex v. Michigan^ 1993), 113 S.Ct. at 1091.
Moreover, the Fex Court addressed the "malicious, careless, and negligent-warden
argument" by explaining "the IAD unquestionably requires delivery, and only after that has
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occurred can one entertain the possibility of counting the 180 days from the transmittal to the
warden...[and]..the careless or malicious warden, under the petitioner's interpretation, may
be unable to delay commencement of the 180-day period, but can prevent it entirely, by
simply failing to forward the request." Id at 1091. The Court continued "more importantly,
however, the worst-case scenario under petitioner's interpretation produces results that are
significantly worse: If, through negligence of the warden, a prisoner's IAD request is
delivered to the prosecutor more than 180 days after it was transmitted to the warden, the
prosecution will be precluded before the prosecutor even knows it has been requested. It is
possible, though by no means certain, that this consequence could be avoided by the
receiving state court's invocation of the "good-cause continuance" clause of Article
III(a)-but it seems to us implausible that such a plainly undesirable result was meant to be
avoided only by resort to the (largely discretionary) application of that provision. It is more
reasonable to think that the receiving State's prosecutors are in no risk of losing their case
until they have been informed of the request for trial." Fexv. Michigan/1993), 113 S.Ct.
at 1090.
Upon this premise, the Crosland Court ruled "the 180-day period could not have
begun until Utah authorities actually received Crosland's request and received notice that
there was a valid request for trial...[and]...[s]ince the circuit court and the district court
properly concluded that none of Crosland's requests were delivered, we deny Crosland's
petition for a writ of mandamus." Crosland v. State, at 946.
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Returning now to the "Intrastate Detainer Statute," in 1980 the Utah Legislature
repealed in Title 77, Chapters 1 to 66, and replaced them with Chapters 1 to 34. See Utah
Code Ann. §77-29-1. Thus, the prisoners "Intrastate detainer statute" became Utah Code
Ann. §77-29-1 which states:
"(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison,
jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the
prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority,
or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature
of the charge and the court where it is pending and requesting disposition of
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt fo the demand
described in Subsection( 1), shall immediately cause the demand to forwarded
by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the
appropriate prosecuting attorney or clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial
officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the
attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the
demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is not supported by good cause, whether previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice." (Emphasis added).
The new legislation did alter the language in the statute, yet still required the same
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procedural requirements. Yet, it was clear, prior to 1980, that under the Utah's "Intrastate
Detainer Statute" the commencement of the 120-day detainer statute did not begin to run
until the prosecuting agency and the court received notice of the written demand and this
same interpretation is still true, as of today, for the sister-legislation of Utah's "Interstate
Detainer Statute."
Beginning in 1985, a gradual deviation from these previously stated majority views
altered and changed the procedural interpretation only for a Utah "Intrastate Detainee," yet
maintained and emphasized the statutes policy concerns of the Utah's "Intrastate" detainer
statute's as originally ruled upon under §77-65-1. This altered interpretation began in the per
curium decision of State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah 1985). In Viles, the defendant
appealed from a judgment conviction from a trial held outside of the 120-day period. The
defendant was incarcerated and retained an attorney on his pending charges. On May 30,
1984, the defendant delivered his notice and request for disposition of the pending charges.
However, he argued on appeal that his attorney's filing of the notice of appearance, which
occurred previous to May 30, constituted notice provided in section 77-29-1 and his trial was
not held for 150 days from that filing.
In a brief opinion, the Viles Court cites the Taylor Court and State v. Valasquez, 641
P.2d 115 (Utah 1982), indicating the same purpose of the former statute exists under section
77-29-1 stating "the purpose of the statute is to protect the constitutional right of prisoners
to a speedy trial and to compel law enforcement authorities to promptly prosecute charges
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against prisoner" and "the statutory scheme represents a legislative expression of the time
limits that constitute a speedy public trial under the Utah Constitution" and "the 120 day
period commences to run from the date of delivery of the written notice." State v. Viles, at
1176. While relying on the Taylor Court for statutory purpose and policy, the Viles Court,
without any legislative interpretation analysis, nor explaining the interrelation, if any, to §7729-1(1) and (2), indirectly deviated from the procedural ruling in Taylor and ruled "§77-29-1
places the burden on the prisoner to give notice to the warden before he is entitled to have
the charge disposed of within the statutory period of time." The Viles Court then simply
computed the 120-days beginning on March 30, 1984 when the defendant delivered the
notice to the warden.
Subsequently, in State v. Heaton, where the prosecutor and court received notice, but
then transferred to another court and a trial was never scheduled until after 120 days began
to run, the Court, relying upon Viles, stated "the detainer statute clearly provides that the
120-day period commences on the date the written delivery is delivered "to the warden,
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or appropriate agent of the same." 958 P.2d 911,916
(Utah 1998); Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1.

Therefore, the Heaton Court concluded

"administrative mistakes" do not constitute good cause "because to hold that good cause is
supported by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor could contradict
the language in section 77-29-1 (4) which places the burden of complying with the statute on
the prosecution." Id at 915.
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Like the Viles Court, the Heaton Court fails to explain the significance, relationship,
applicability, if any, and/or the statutory construction of the language of §77-29-1(1) to §7729-1(2) and the relationship of §77-29-1 to §77-29-5. Rather, the Heaton Court merely
commutes the 120-day time period from the date the warden received the written demand by
relying on Viles, without any mention to the Taylor Court's contrary procedural ruling of
§77-29-lfs predecessor statute of §77-65-1. See Id at 916. Ironically enough though, the
Heaton Court does rely on pre-§77-29-l case law by determining the burden of compliance
was on the prosecution by applying the Wilson Court's holding and then applies Wilson to
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(4) as it related to subsection (1).
Therefore, it is ironically clear that these cases fail to maintain a procedural
consistency in commencement of the statute by applying case law interpretation for §77-651 to support policy issues and compliance under §77-29-1, but fail to apply these same cases,
as they relate to actual notice and delivery to the appropriate prosecuting attorney as required
under §77-29-l(2)-(3) and its sister legislation of §77-29-5. Moreover, in light of §77-29-5
and the Crosland Court, such legal holdings have created two systems for speedy trial
resolutions under the same Utah system. Additionally, because the Speedy trial right is
constitutionally based, the Viles and Heaton Courts interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §7729-1, without interpreting the statute as a whole and with other sections, chapters, and in light
of Taylor, Crosland, and Fex, provides for an unequal application of constitutional rights
between intrastate and interstate detainers through a creation of two separate systems
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through judicial interpretation, because both §77-29-1 and §77-29-5 are both statutorily
created and therefore should provide the same protections under the Federal and Utah State
Constitution as they apply to speedy trial rights.
Also, it is also relevant to note that the Fex and Crosland Court's decisions were
decided after Viles-Viles being decided in 1985 and Fex and Crosland both being decided
in 1993. When the court in Viles ruled that under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 commencement
of the statute begins when the Warden/prison receives the written demand for disposition the
court did not have the privilege of reviewing the Fex and Crosland courts rulings to generate
statutory harmony between §77-29-1 and §77-29-5 so as to treat prisoners under the same
system "side by side." Yet, the Crosland Court's decision reflects the judicial interpretation
and application of Fex because the IAD is a u;congressionally sanctioned interstate compact
the interpretation of which presents a question of law," Crosland v. State, at 945, and
specifically denied Crosland's argument of de facto notice, Crosland v. State, at 946; an
argument which the trial court in this case applied to dismiss the case against the appellee
stating the City of Orem had Constructive notice when the Warden received the 120 day
written notice. (R.at 71).
In light of Crosland being decided after Viles, the following difficulties have arisen;
First, no adequate explanation and interpretation or statutory construction exists to define the
meaning of §77-29-1, particularly between subpart (1) and (2) and how they relate to §77-295, and second, because Crosland interpreted §77-29-5 in light of Fex, the Court has created
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tension and confusion between §77-29-1, the Utah "Intrastate Detainer Statute," and §77-295, the Utah "Interstate Detainer Statute," by applying different rules to an interstate detainee
as compared to an interstate detainee. Because the Viles court deviated from Taylor in ruling
commencement of the statute for intrastate detainees begins upon receipt by the
Warden/prison, and subsequent to Viles, the Crosland Court concluded that commencement
for interstate detainees begins when the appropriate prosecutor receives notice , the Utah
Supreme Court has created two different sets of rules governing the commencement of
speedy disposition periods for prisoners in the same system under the same Federal and Utah
State Constitutions governing speedy trial rights.
By adhering to Fex and applying federal interpretation to §77-29-5 the Utah Supreme
Court indirectly created disharmony, contusion, and an unequal application of law as to
intrastate detainee's when it ruled in Crosland. The Crosland Court did not have the luxury
of applying the Viles Court's holding under the judicial tool of stare decisis because
application of federal law mandated a ruling contrary to Viles as it applied to §77-29-1.
Yet the purpose and policy behind both statutes is to "encourage the expeditious and orderly
disposition of charges [outstanding against a prisoner], Crosland v. State, at 946, and "the
purpose of these statutes is to carry into effect the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial
and to more precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial" as the term is used in the
constitutions of the various states. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361; 453 P.2d 158, 159
(Utah 1969). However, since Crosland there exists two separate rules for detainees both
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of which are under the same system yet depending on whether a prisoner is an interstate or
intrastate detainee determines when commencement of the statute begins.
Therefore, the City of Orem requests the Court of Appeals certify this case to the Utah
Supreme Court for the purpose of the Utah Supreme Court to review the Viles and Heaton
Court's ruling and entertain the City of Orem's request to overrule Viles and Heaton and
conform to the Taylor, Moore, Crosland, and the Fex Courts' ruling based upon statutory
construction, policy, and to eliminate the two created different sets of rules governing the
commencement of speedy disposition periods for prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the
same system.
B. FAILURE TO COMMENCE COMPUTATION OF THE 120 DAY DETAINER
NOTICE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 UPON ACTUAL NOTICE BY THE
APPROPRIATE PROSECUTOR AND FAILING TO READ UTAH CODE ANN.§77-29-l
AS A WHOLE AND ITS PROVISIONS INTERPRETED IN HARMONY WITH OTHER
PROVISIONS OF THE SAME STATUTE AND WITH OTHER STATUTES UNDER THE
SAME, RELATED CHAPTER CREATES AN UNEQUAL APPLICATION OF LAW
BETWEEN INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE DETAINEES.

In reviewing the trial court's application of section 77-29-1, the Utah Courts of
Appeal will apply long-standing rules of statutory construction, State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT
App 379, f 17,18 P.3d 504, and statutory construction is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness. Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). The
Courts primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent.
State v. Lindsay, atfl7:GohlervWood. 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996). When examining
a statute, the Court will look to its plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's
23

intent and purpose in passing the statute. See Id at ^J17; See Perrine v.Kennecott Mining
Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). Therefore, where the statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, the Court will not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine
legislative intent. See Id at ^[17; Horton v."Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168
(Utah 1991)(citation omitted). The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and
its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and "with
other statutes under the same and related chapters "Id at f 17(emphasis added); Roberts v.
Erickson, 851 P.2d 643,644 (Utah 1993)(per curium)(citation omitted). Furthermore, where
possible, the Courts will construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their
terms. Id at |17: Schultz v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108. 1112 (Utah 1991).
Giving full effect to the language of subsections (1 )-(4), and reading them in harmony
with each other and Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5, it is apparent the commencement of the 120day statute should begin to run upon receipt by the "appropriate prosecutor" and the court.
In review of Viles and the Heaton Court decisions, it is clear those decisions do not give
adequate legislative interpretation and fail to give full effect to the language of subpart (1)(4), thereby creating a harmonious reading with the entire statute of §77-29-1, and especially
as it relates to §77-29-5.
Standing alone, §77-29-1(1) could arguably be interpreted as requiring delivery to the
warden to commence the 120-day requirement, but, even so, nowhere in subsection (1) does
the statute state commencement shall begin to run when he warden receives the notice,
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rather, it only states the defendant is entitled to have the charge brought to trial "within 120days of delivery of written notice"and subsection (3) only refers back to delivery as required
under subsection (1). See Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(1) and (3). The statute fails to state
specifically that for commencement of the statute to begin delivery is required only to the
warden and not to the prosecutor, albeit it may inferred from the text. However, this narrow
approach and interpretation renders parts or words in §77-29-1(2), requiring the mandatory
delivery by the warden to the appropriate prosecutor, inoperative and superfluous. See State
v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995). Moreover, such reading violates the Cardinal rule
that "the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the
parts be interpreted as the subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object, Miller v.
Weaver. 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592; Faux v. Mickelsen. 725 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah
1986)(quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §46:05 (4th ed.
1998), because "a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by
one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole." Id at f 17;
quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §96:05 (4th ed. 1998)."Id
at 1|17.
Simply focusing on subsection (1) of the statute without reading and interpreting the
entire section as a whole and in conjunction with §77-29-5 creates disharmony between the
sections and related statutes while establishing two different sets of rules governing the
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commencement of speedy disposition periods for prisoners (in-state and out-of-state) in the
same system. Prior to Viles, consistency existed under each statute and section, while
maintaining a singular set of rules under the same Utah system. Clearly "consistency seems
more desirable in this context than confusion/' State v. Morris, 126 Wn.2d 306, 892 P.2d
734, 737 (Wash. 1995), and there is "no utility in a potentially confusing situation" in
creating two different means of measuring the commencement of the speedy disposition
period" for prisoners under the same Utah system, only distinguished by whether or not
incarceration is in or out of state. See Id at 737.
This dilemma also occurred in the State of Washington in State v. Morris, 126 Wn.2d
306, 892 P.2d 734,737 (Wash. 1995). In Moms, the Defendant was charged with theft and
while incarcerated filed with the prison warden a request for speedy disposition of the theft
charge. The request was forwarded to prosecutor and the court, but he argued on appeal that
the time began to run under the intrastate detainer statute when the warden received the
notice, not when the prosecuting attorney and court received the notice. (It should be noted
that Washington's statute for Intrastate detainers parallels the language of the "Interstate
Detainer Statute or IAD. It is also similar to Utah's previous Intrastate statute and current
Interstate Detainer statute.")
On appeal to the Washington Court of Appeal, the Court agreed with the defendant
by relying on the minority opinion in Fex. The Court of Appeals stressed the analysis ofFex
is persuasive, but not controlling authority for the interpretation of similarly worded
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Washington States Intrastate detainer statute, and based on the dissent in Fex, ruled th^ focus
of the statute of the relevant language is on the prisoner's act, which is complete when he
transmits his request to the warden. Id at 737(emphasis added).
The Washington Supreme Court recognized the Court of Appeals creation of two
different rules for prisoners held under the same system and overruled the Court of Appeals.
Concerned for the unequal treatment amongst incarcerated prisoners, the Washington
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fex decision ultimately controls the Washington
Interstate detainer statute, because it is federal law and pointed out "[rjegardless of how
convincing one finds the Fex majority, its interpretation now governs the Interstate
Agreement of Detainers for prisoners subject to the IAD in this state." Id at 737. Therefore,
because the Fex court controls the Interstate detainer statute and that prisoners are to be
treated equal under Washington States system, the Washington Supreme Court refused to
adopt the multiple system created by the Court of Appeals and emphasized "prisoners subject
to the IAD exist side by side in our state's prisons with prisoner subject: to the Washington
intrastate detainer statute." Id at 737.(emphasis added).
The Court continued "it is unnecessarily confusing to create two different sets of rules
governing the commencement of speedy disposition period for prisoners in the same system."
Id at 737. The Court reasoned that "consistency seems more desirable here than confusion."
Id at 737. Moreover, being influenced by the Fex Court's illustration that the IAD's
statutory language created a system to document "receipt" of the detainer by the provision
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of Article 111(b) requiring the warden to forward the prisoner's request and accompanying
documents 'by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested,

Fex v.

Michigan/1993), 113 S.Ct. at 1091, the Washington Supreme Court found similarly that
under the Intrastate detainer statute "a precise measuring event is more desirable than an
unverifiable or indeterminate one...[and]...[o]f the two different interpretations, the Fex
majority adopts a more verifiable and easily ascertained measuring event; by return receipt,
thus the Court held that "actual receipt by the prosecuting attorney and superior court of the
county in which the indictment, information, or complaint is pending commences the 120-day
period. State v. Morris, at 738.
Upon these premises, the City of Orem requests the Utah Supreme Court review §7729-l(l)-(4) and §77-29-5 to reach a harmonious interpretation of these statutes and treat
prisoners under both statutes equally by declaring the statute commence when the
prosecution receives notice of the detainer statute and refuse to create two different rules
under the same system. By Juxtaposing Utah Code §77-29-1(1) and (2) and §77-25-5Art.
111(b), which requires "written notice and request for final disposition ...shall be given or sent
by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate
prosecuting official and court..."it is clear that the warden is only an intermediary between
the prisoner and the prosecutor, and delivery to the prosecution and the Court is the essential
step for the commencement of the statute.
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Based upon these foregoing principles of judicial interpretation and case law, the City
of Orem respectfully argues the legislature specifically intended on the "appropriate
prosecutor" to receive actual notice, not constructive notice, to commence the preceding
against the defendant. Utah Code Ann.§77-29-1(2). The City disagrees with the trial courts
conclusion that the commencement of the statute began when the city received "constructive
notice" through the state when the warden/prison received the notice. (R.at 71).
The reading of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (2) even supports the requirement of "actual
notice" because the warden "shall cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or
certified mail, return receipt requested." The existence of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2)
created a system to document "receipt" of the detainer by the provision requiring the warden
to forward the prisoner's request and accompanying documents 'by personal delivery or
certified mail, return receipt requested," and this method is a precise measuring event more
desirable than an unverifiable or indeterminate one, and of the two different interpretations
it is a more verifiable and easily ascertained measuring event. Also, if the time period
commenced and ended prior to receipt by the prosecuting attorney, as in the present case, the
prosecutor could never request from the Warden such information concerning the term of
commitment of the demanding prisoner as "shall be requested." and Utah Code Ann. §77-291(2).
In this case the Warden was merely neglectful in his duties although he did attempt
to deliver the notice to the Utah County Attorney, which was never forwarded to the Orem
29

City Attorneys office. However, this was not the appropriate prosecuting agency and Utah
Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) requires the warden to personally deliver or send via certified mail,
return receipt requested to the appropriate prosecuting attorney. By the trial court concluding
the City had constructive notice, the language, policy, and purpose of Utah Code §77 chapter
29 is violated and fails to give equal protection of constitutional rights to prisoners both
interstate and intrastate. This is evident because as an intrastate detainee, rather than an
interstate, the trial court concluded, despite the bench warrant which the city believed was
still active, the City had constructive notice of his arrest and incarceration when he submitted
his request for disposition to the warden/prison. Under the same title and chapter of Utah
Code Ann.§77-29-5, if the defendant would have been an interstate detainee he would not
have had his case dismissed because of the Fex court and Crosland rulings that
commencement of the time does not begin to run until receipt by the appropriate prosecuting
attorney. Therefore, because the Fex Court is federal law and §77-29-5 is subject to such
judicial interpretation, as illustrated in Crosland, §77-29-1 should interpreted the same and
follow similar reasoning to provide harmony, clarity, and the equal application of law to all
prisoners held under the same Utah system.
In essence, the VUes, Peterson, and Heaton Court's decisions relating to
commencement of the statutory time period, fails to give proper, clear, and exhaustive
judicial interpretation, and simply deviated from the Taylor Courts ruling. Also, it is in
stark contrast to the Crosland Court's interpretation of Utah IAD. Thus, the Utah Supreme
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Court creation of two different sets of rules for prisoners under the same system results in
disharmony between the policy, purposes, and intent of the statutes which is contrary to the
constitutional rights of a speedy trial; for if the interstate and intrastate statute are both
designed to precisely define what is meant by "speedy trial" as the term is used, than they
should be interpreted in a harmonious fashion and provide the equal application to prisoners
held under the same system.
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE CITY OF OREM HAD
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE 120 DEMAND FOR DISPOSITION WHEN THE
WARDEN FAILED TO PERSONALLY DELIVER OR SEND CERTIFIED MAIL,
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED, AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 (2).

In Utah there are two types of notices; Actual or Constructive. Actual notice has been
said to be of two kinds: (1) express, which includes direct information, and (2) implied,
which is inferred from the fact that the person charged had means of knowledge which it was
his duty to use. 58 Am. Jur. 2d. Notice §6. Thus, notice is regarded in law as actual where
the person sought to be charged therewith either knows of the existence of the particular facts
in question or is conscious of having the means of knowing it, even though such means may
not be employed by him or her. See Perry v. O'Donnell 749 F.2d 1346, 1351 (9th Cir.
1984). Similar to implied actual notice is constructive notice. 58 Am. Jur. 2d. Notice §7.
Constructive notice is a legal inference or a legal presumption of notice which may not be
disputed or controverted. See Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty Co.,
249 U.S. 12, 63 L.Ed. 447, 39 S.Ct. 231 (1919); Hotchv. United States. 14 Alaska 594,
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212 F.2d 280 (9 Cir. 1954). The importance of the classification of notice of this character
arises fromm the fact that constructive notice is a legal inference, while implied actual notice
is an inference of fact. 58 Am. Jur. 2d. Notice §7. Finally, the closely related concept of
inquiry notice exists where a person has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and
prudent person using ordinary care to make further inquiries. Shacked v. Roger Smith
Aircraft Sales. Inc.. F.Supp. 675, 690 (N.D. 111. 1986), affd, 841 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1988);
see discussion at 58 Am. Jur. 2d.Notice §6 & 15 (creating a third type of notice which
resembles both constructive and actual notice). Under this theory, a person who fails to
diligently inquire is charged with knowledge that would have been required through such
inquiry. 58 Am. Jur. 2d.Notice,§15.
In Utah, Actual notice is notice which "is positively proved to have been given to a
party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed to have received personally because
the evidence within his knowledge was sufficient to put him upon inquiry." In re Discipline
ofSonnenreick 2004 UT 3, P22; 2004 Utah LEXIS 1; Blacks Law Dictionary 733 (6th ed.
1991). This is to be distinguished from constructive notice, where information or knowledge
of a fact is imputed to a person by law "because he could have discovered the fact by proper
diligence, and his situation was such as to cast upon him the duty of inquiry into it." In re
Discipline of Sonnenreicbu 2004 UT 3, P22; 2004 Utah LEXIS 1; Blacks Law Dictionary
733 (6th ed. 1991).
There are two types of constructive notice that are generally recognized; Utah

32

recognizes both. First American Title Insurance v. J.B. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah
1998). One kind of constructive notice is notice which result from a record or which is
imputed by the recording statutes; and the other is notice which is presumed because of the
fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to,
knowledge of the ultimate facts. Id at 837. The first type is evident in the Utah Recording
Statute, which provides that documents and instruments filed with the county recorder
pursuant to this statute "impart notice to all persons of their contents." Id at 837. Utah Case
law also recognizes the second type of constructive notice-inquiry notice. Id at 837; See
County Bd.of Equalization v. State Tax Common. 789P.2d291,294 (Utah 1990); Meyer v.
General American Corp., 569P.2d 1094,1097 (Utah 1977)(stating that "constructive notice
can occur when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to
require further inquiry on his part"). Inquiry notice "occurs when circumstances arise that
should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part." Meyer,
569 P2d at 1097. In Allied Materials, the Court stated the rule of inquiry notice as follows:
"whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for
inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. First American Title
Insurance v. J.B. Ranch, at 838 (Utah 1998); Salt Lake. Garfield & W.Rv. v. Allied
Materials Co.. 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 883, (1995). When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it." Id at 838.
Based upon such legal reasoning and explanation of actual and constructive notice,
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the City of Orem appeals the courts finding of "constructive notice" for two reasons; first,
the plain language of the statute of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) prohibits "constructive
notice"and second, even if this Court finds the plain language of the statute allows for
constructive notice, the failure to receive notice of the defendant's arrest (facts which the trial
court considered irrelevant) and the 120-day written demand for disposition ofpending cases,
certainly proves the city did not receive "notice enough to excite attention and put the City
on guard and call for inquiry and lead the City to a fact (incarceration and the existence of
the 120-day demand), to be deemed conversant of it.
A review of the plain language of the statute, and applying the provisions interpreted
in harmony with other provisions in the statute, indicates the Trial Court erred in reaching
a conclusion of imputing "Constructive Knowledge" to the City when the warden receive the
written demand of the 120-day request for disposition of pending charges. First, Utah Code
Ann §77-29-1(2) requires strict compliance of delivery of the 120-demand to the appropriate
prosecuting agency. It states the "warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the
demand described in Subsection(l), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded
by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate
prosecuting attorney or clerk." This requirement of personal delivery or certified delivery,
return receipt requested, is actual notice which is positively proved to have been given to a
party directly and personally. See In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, at P22. In State v
Peterson, the Court recognizes this mandatory language by stating "Section 77-29-1(2)
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requires that any custodial officer, upon receipt of a notice of disposit ion, "shall immediately
cause the demand to be forwarded... to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and clerk." State
v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991).
By imputing "constructive knowledge" of the defendant's incarceration and arrest
through delivery of the written demand as laid out in Utah Code. Ann §77-29-1(1), and thus
refusing to find "good cause," the Court fails to give meaning to Utah Code. Ann §77-291(2) and renders it ineffective and meaningless. When the Utah Supreme Court ruled in
Peterson and Heaton "It is apparent that the legislature intended to place the burden of
compliance of the statute on the prosecutor," State v. Petersen, at 424, and "the mere fact
that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor has never been considered dispositive
because 'to hold that good cause is supported by the lone fact that the delay was not caused
by the prosecutor would contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4), which places the
burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution'"State v. Heaton, at 915, it is
important to note both Courts fail to mention, address, and entirely leave out any remedy for
noncompliance with Utah Code. Ann §77-29-1(2). Yet, by placing the burden on the
prosecutor upon delivery of the 120-day demand for disposition without allowing for "good
cause" for a custodial official failing to comply with Utah Code. Ann §77-29-1(2) the
"shall" language is rendered ineffective and meaningless. For this very reason Heaton must
be narrowly construed to restrict Courts from finding

"good cause" only when the

prosecution has received actual notice (as required by Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2))
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coupled with neglecting the notice and the affirmative duty through inaction of bringing the
defendant to trial within 120 day, even for administrative errors of the court or other state
agencies.
Even a review of section §77-29-1(4) supports narrowly restricting Heaton's ruling
to inaction of the prosecutor only after receiving actual notice by stating "in the event the
charge is not brought to trial within 120 days.. .the court will determine if' good cause' exists
to allow for the trial to be held outside the 120-day requirement. Utah Code. Ann §77-291(4). Such language provides an exception to the heavy burden placed upon prosecutors.
In this case, the custodial officer, court, and defendant failed to deliver any notice of
the 120-day notice for disposition of pending charges in Orem city or give notice of the
defendants arrest. The City was unaware the defendant was picked up on the bench warrant
and incarcerated. Even assuming constructive notice may be imputed to the city, failure to
receive notice of either the arrest on the bench warrant or the 120-day detainer request, as
required by Utah Code Ann. Section 77-29-1(2), does not give the City enough notice to
excite attention and put the City on guard and call for inquiry, thus giving notice of
everything to which such inquiry might have led. Moreover, failing to receive notice of
arrest or the 120-day notice is insufficient to lead the City to a fact (the filing of the 120-day
detainer notice) to deem the city conversant of it. The Trial Court points to no facts or
circumstances that arise to put a reasonable person (the City) on guard so as to require further
inquiry. There must be more than the mere arrest or delivery of the 120-day notice demand
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to the warden as required by section §77-29-1(1) so as to put the city on notice.
It is clear from the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) the legislature
intended the appropriate prosecution agency to receive "actual delivery" to the appropriate
prosecuting attorney and clerk, thereby giving actual notice-not constructive notice. Such
reasoning is consistent with State v. Wells, 110 Ohio App.3d 275; 673 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio
App. 1996). In Wells, the defendant was indicted on seven criminal counts and imprisoned
in California on unrelated convictions. The defendant mailed a request for speedy trial,
pursuant to Article 111(a) of the "Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), to the County
Prosecutor. However, the postal service misdelivered his request to the City Attorney's
office. The defendant moved for dismissal of the indictment, arguing he had not been
brought to trial within 180 days of delivery of his request as required by the IAD.
The trial Court denied the motion and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals
ruled "the appellant had made out a prima facia case of actual delivery to the Franklin
County Prosecutor by the fact that his IAD request was sent by certified mail, return receipt
requested...however, because the prosecution claimed that the individual whose signature
appears on the return receipt had never been employed by the Franklin County Prosecutor"
the case was again remanded to allow the prosecution to substantiate its claim of
nondelivery. State v. Wells. 110 Ohio App.3d 275, 277-78; 673 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio App.
1996). The trial court then found the Franklin County Prosecutor's office did not have actual
or constructive notice of appellant's demand for prompt disposition of charges pending. Id
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at 278.
The defendant appealed the second trial court ruling and argued "the Franklin County
Prosecutor had constructive notice of the IAD request, that is, constructively took delivery
of the request, based on the close relationship between the prosecutor and the city attorney's
officer, and for the proposition that the city attorney's office and the Franklin County
Prosecutor have intertwined responsibilities, are departments of a single sovereign, and
should be bound by each other's acts and omissions." Id at 279. The defendant relied upon
State v. Crawford. 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 107, unreported (1996 Opinions 100), to support
his theory.
The Ohio Interstate detainer statute stated "upon the request of a prisoner held in
another state, the jurisdiction of that filed the detainer must bring the prisoner to trial within
one hundred eighty days of receipt of the request... [and]... shall be brought to trial within one
hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer
and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place
of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment,
information or complaint. Id at 278; R.C.2963.30, Article III(e)(emphasis added). The Ohio
Court of Appeals ruled three things. First, Crawford did not stand for the proposition that
every county prosecutor is bound by the acts and omissions of every political subdivision of
the state of Ohio, because the oversight in Crawford was committed by an employee of the
state; the oversight in this case was committed by an employee of either a municipal
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corporation or the federal government. Id at 280. Second, the court declined to apply the
rule of agency applicable to a state's duty under a state statute in the context of receipt of an
IAD request when that duty does not exits under the IAD. Id at 280. Lastly, the Court ruled
"constructive notice" or constructive delivery of the IAD request is insufficient to trigger the
one-hundred-eighty-day speedy trial period.
In reaching their third reason the Court relied upon Fex v. Michigan (1993), 507 U.S.
43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1087, stating "we hold that the 180-day time period in Article 111(a) of
the IAD does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges
against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction
that lodged the detainer against him." Id at 281. The holding of Fex addresses the issue of
which event triggers the one-hundred-eighty-day period; the issue in Wells is whether that
event has occurred. Id at 281. The Wells Court found Fex to be persuasive authority that
constructive delivery is insufficient to trigger the one-hundred-eighty-day period in Article
111(a) of the IAD. Id at 281.
Both Wells and Crosland refused to apply de facto notice or constructive notice to the
interstate detainer statute because the warden has a duty to forward and deliver to the
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court. Likewise, under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1, et
seq., there exists a duty by the warden/prisoner to deliver the written notice to the appropriate
prosecuting attorney and court. Thus, Heaton is not applicable to this case given the
appropriate prosecuting attorney, the City of Orem Attorney's office, did not receive actual
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notice as required under Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (2). Therefore, the City of Orem prays this
court reinstate the charges against the defendant by overturning the trial courts ruling that the
City of Orem had constructive notice. If the Court does not find the above reasoning
persuasive, that commencement of statute begins upon receipt by the appropriate prosecuting
agency, the City requests this Court find the existence of good cause to continue with the trial
outside the 120-day disposition based upon the reasons stated, or in the alternative, to remand
back to the trial court to determine if good cause exists when the city did not have actual
notice.
In addition, if this Court remands back to the trial court, the City of Orem proffers
several factors, in addition to other factors already annunciated by the Utah Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals that allow for good cause so as the trial court may address the fairness
argument of neglect and delay caused by the warden/prison to determine good cause.
Currently, most court decisions allowing for good cause reach such a conclusion because of
some act by the defendant which hinders, delays, or thwarts the efforts of the prosecution.
However, because the prosecution does have the strict burden of complying with the statute
it is difficult and almost impossible to comply with the statute if a trial court concludes
constructive notice is placed upon the prosecution but fails to grant good cause when the
prosecution never realized or had actual notice the burden had even commenced. Thus, the
City requests the adoption of other factors or guidelines to assist the trial court in determining
good cause when the prosecution never receive "actual notice" of the written demand and a
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charges could be dismissed for failure to prosecute with 120 days.

This is particularly

important and essential given certain rights afforded to victims. The dismissing of a charge
for failure to prosecute within the 120 day time frame without finding good cause, even if
the prosecution did not act in bad faith or negligence through inaction, may jeopardize or
prejudice victims and create further abuse, harassment, unfairness, or disrespect to a victim
through the dismissal of charges. Surely the rights of a victim should be considered in
determining whether good cause exists prior to dismissal of criminal charges given the
victims bill of rights. Therefore, the City proffers a series of other factors a trial court could
apply to determine whether good cause exists to continue a trial beyond the 120 day period.
They are as follows:
1) Was the delay in bringing the defendant to trial caused by action or inaction
of the prosecutor or the defendant?
2) If there is further delay beyond the 120 day disposition will the defendant
be precluded from bringing forth an adequate defense? (e.g., Are witnesses
and evidence still available?)
3) Was the defendant being held in prison/jail on other criminal matters which
would not substantially harm the defendant as a result of the warden's action
or inaction in delivery of the notice to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and
court?
4) Did the defendant suffer substantial, irreparable harm as a result of inaction
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or action by the warden for failure to forward the notice to the appropriate
prosecution agency? (e.g., was he deprived of an opportunity to obtain a
sentence to run concurrently with a sentence being served at the time the
detainer is filed or being ineligible to receive any type- of treatment, work
release, transfer to a less secure living facility, etc.)
5) If good cause is not granted to the prosecution, will the dismissal of the
charges against the defendant result in prejudice or violation of the rights of
a victim? (e.g., would any right granted under Utah Code Ann.§77-38 or §7737-3 (victims bill of rights) be prejudiced and violated as a result of the
dismissal?)
These factors take into consideration both the intentional and negligent conduct of the
defendant, prosecution, and the warden/prison, while simultaneously requiring the trial court
to consider the rights of the victim, the defendant, and the prosecuting agency. Therefore,
the Appellant respectfully requests this court find the trial court erred in ruling that the City
of Orem had constructive notice because Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2) requires actual notice,
and thus good cause exists to bring the defendant to trial outside the 120-day detainer
statutory period, or in the alternative, adopt the factors provided by the City and remand back
to the trial court to determine if good cause exists.
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POINT II.
FAILURE TO RECEIVE NOTICE OF THE WRITTENDEMAND FOR 120DAY DISPOSITION OF CASE PENDING IN OREM CITY WARRANTS
GOOD CAUSE TO EXTEND AND CONDUCT THE TRIAL OUTSIDE OF
THE 120-DAY REQUIREMENT.
In the alternative, the City requests the Utah Court of Appeals clarify Viles and
Heaton and provide for a "good cause" exception as listed under §77-29-1(2)-(3) by ruling
the "appropriate prosecuting" attorney must receive actual notice rather than constructive
notice. As stated above, the City's brief provides for the basis of the motion for certification
to the Utah Supreme Court, and in the alternative, for the Utah Court of Appeal to decide the
issues presented on Appeal.
Despite the heavy burden placed upon prosecutors, the statute does provide for
exceptions to the statutory requirements if good cause can be shown. The statute provides
that "the 120-day period may be extended by either party for good cause shown in open
court, Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(3) & (4), or by a defendant who causes a trial to be delayed.
State v.Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,1329-30 (Utah 1986) (defendant's delay of atrial constitutes
a temporary waiver of his right to a speedy trial); State v. Valasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116
(Utah 1982) (providing the same with respect to the 90-day disposition period under the
former statute).
When a trial court is asked to consider a motion to dismiss, pursuant to the detainer
statute, it must do so under a two-step inquiry. State v. Coleman, 2001 Ut App 281, f6.
First, the Court must determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it expired.
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Id at | 6 . Second, if the trial was or is going to be held outside the 120-day period, it must
determine whether "good cause" will excuse the delay. State v. Lindsay, at ^|9; State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916. The Utah Courts have stated "good cause" that will excuse
failure of the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial within the time required means (1)
delay caused by the defendant - - such as asking for a continuance, or (2) a relatively short
delay caused by unforseen problems arising immediately prior to trial. State v. Coleman,
2001 UT App 281,1J6 , 34 P.3d 790.; quoting State v. Peterson. 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah
1991)
In this case the trial court found that the 120-day delay began to run on October 17,
2002. (R.at 74). The 120-day period expired on February 14, 2003. (R.at74). The Trial
Court relied upon Heaton, and found "administrative errors of state personnel" were not
grounds for good cause. (R.at2-73). The Court found this case is similar to Heaton in that
"an administrative error of the warden that extended the, that resulted in the 120 day period
not running as the statute would require. But that was a very similar case. I'd like the
findings to reflect that I'm persuaded by Heaton's ruling." (Tr. Volume I of I, Pg. 44-45).
The trial court refused to find "good cause"; refuting several of the city's arguments.
The Court ruled "the written demand delivered by the Defendant identified Orem City as a
prosecuting agency. From the date the warden received it, Orem City had constructive
knowledge of defendant's arrest and incarceration. The fact the defendant failed to appear
and was the subject of a bench warrant prior to his incarceration at the prison is simply not
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relevant to the Court's decision." (R.at 71,72).
The City argues that Heaton, as well as all other cases in Utah addressing Utah Code
Ann.§77-29-1, et seq., are not on point and are factually distinguishable. First, cases that
have addressed Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 have dealt with issues after the appropriate
prosecuting agency has been given notice. The City of Orem did not receive notice of the
defendant's arrest nor the written demand for 120-day disposition. Second, the defendant's
written demand contained factual inaccuracies and/or was incomplete. Third, the time delay
in bringing the defendant to trial was not caused by the Orem City Attorney's office. Fourth,
unlike Heaton, where the case was transferred to a different court and the clerk failed to
schedule a trial within the 120-day requirement, the defendant's case did not "fall through
a crack in the prosecutor's office, even though the prosecutor's office received Heaton's
detainer notice"- Orem City never knew the defendant had been arrested on the warrant or
was incarcerated.
Furthermore, Heaton does not stand for such a harsh dismissal and as broad of ruling
as the trial court found. Rather, Heaton does provide courts the freedom to grant an
extension, even to prosecutors, if good cause can be shown. The Heaton Court hints of
reasons for the trial court to find good cause to extend the trial outside the 120-day
requirement by stating "this is not to say that the prosecution must succeed, for 'good cause'
may support the prosecutor's failure to comply." Id at 916. Also, the Heaton Court spoke of
an "affirmative duty" to bring the defendant to trial when the prisoner had delivered to the
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warden the written demand. State v. Heaton, at 915. The Court stated "Implicit in this duty
is the duty to notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith
effort to comply with the statute." Id at 915. The issue the Court faced in Heaton focused
on this affirmative duty imposed upon the prosecution and the "inaction by the prosecution"
after receiving notice of the 120-day demand for disposition. The Court expressed this
concern by clarifying "where the prosecutor's failure is inaction - - in this case, doing nothing
whatsoever to bring Heaton's case to trial within the statutory period - - the trial court may
not conclude that the prosecutor's failure is supported by "good cause." In other words
Heaton only restricts a finding of "good cause" when the prosecution has received actual
notice (as required by Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(2)) coupled with neglecting the notice and
the affirmative duty through inaction of bringing the defendant to trial within 120 day, even
for administrative errors of the court, because the burden was on the prosecutor, not the
court. Heaton is not so far reaching as the trial court presumes.
In this case, the prosecution would not even be able to comply with the "affirmative
duty" to notify the court as required in Heaton because the City never received notice.
Ironically, the warden delivered to the Court, but not the 'appropriate prosecuting agency'
notice of the detainer request. Thus, Heaton is factually distinguishable and inapplicable
because Heaton's ruling presumes delivery of the written demand as required in Utah Code
Ann. §77-29-1(2). Therefore, good cause should be granted and the charges reinstated
against the defendant.
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CONCLUSION

the Utah Supreme Court, under Rule 43 of the I Jtah R i lies of \ ppellate procedi ire , for
immediate transfer for determination and to review and overturn the Supreme Court's rulings
of Viles and Heaton and interpret Utah Code Ann.§77-29-1 ,et seq. i n a injunction with I Jtah
Code Ann.§ 7 7-29-5, et seq., and in light of Fex, Crosland, Moore, and the I aylor Courts'

sets of rules governing the commencement of speedy disposition periods for prisoners (instate and out-of-state) in the same system and treat the prisoners "side-by-side." If this
honoi able Coi u tiireli ises to

* *

aitemati v e , the City of Orem requests this Coi irt

clarify Viles and Heaton and provide fo< .. "*"ood cai ise" exception as listed i inder §77 29l(2)-(3) by rilling the "appropriate prosecuting" attorney must receive actual notice not
constructive notice based upon the preceding arguments contained in this brief or remand
vull linn' iitloplinii'i! ol 111« helms listed in llir CIIN \sinn\l li i (in I til n oiiil Imlrleimiin ;: ,IMUI
cause.
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ADDEND! TM 1

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review oi
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except Ihe Publu Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of aoencies of political subdivisions oi die suite
or other local agencies; an.
(in challenge to agencv action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(cj appeals irom ihc juvenile courts.
(d) interlocutory appeals from .m; ^ourt of record m u iininal cases, except
those involving a charge oi a lirsi degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those *< as ;i s
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sougm t pc;. -i:-,
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging
the decisions i the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a
first degree * capital felony;
(h) appeals ii\ m district court involving domestic relations cases, including,
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, oiiiid oustodv,
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court, a
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme ( oun.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by Luc vote of four

judges of the court may certity to the Supreme < ourt for original appellate
review and determination any mnttor over " !:v- the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) T he Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Ch ••'.-.• 4<)b. Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings.

ADDE IN l) i ivf 2

Rule 43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court.
1. (a) Transfer. In any case over which the Court of Appeals has original
appellate jurisdiction, the court may, upon the affirmative vote of four >•• '.. __>
of the court, certify a case for immediate transfer to the Supreme Court for
determination.
(h) Procedure loi lianslci.
(1) The Court of Appeals may, on its own motion, decide whether a case
should be certified. Any party to a case may, however, file and serve an
«>neinal and eight copies of a suggestion for certification not exceeding five
es setting forth the reasons why the party believes that the case should be
certified. The suggestion may not be filed prior to the filing ola docketing
statement. Within ten days of service, an adverse party may file and serve an
original and eight copies of a statement not in excess of five pages either
supporting or opposing ih«-» su<j<>t^liot «o» ee'-tiiVntion.
(I'M pon entry of the oruu ol certification, • icrkof the Court of App^
shall immediately transfer the case, including the record and file of the case
frorh i he trial court, all papers filed in the Court of Appeals, and a w hue•ent of all docket entries in the case up to and including the certilicai m
b the Oerk of the Supreme Court. The Clerk of the Court of \ppeals
i promptl> notify all parties and the clerk of the trial court that the ease
nas been transferred.
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification, the Clerk -a ;U ^upreia «
shall enter the appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court, i he clerk el u e
Supreme Court shall immediately send notices to all parties and u -he clerk
•>1 the trial court that the case has been docketed and that all further filings
be made with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The notice shall state the
docket number assigned to the case in the Supreme Court. The case shall
proceed before the Supreme Court to final decision and disposition as in
other appellate cases pursuant to these rules.
^ i i i i lie record on appeal has not been filed with the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals as of the date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the Court of

Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial court that upon completion of the
conditions for filing the record by that court, the clerk shall transmit the
record on appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. If. however, the record
on appeal has already been transmitted to and filed with ihe Clerk of the
Court of Appeals as of the date of the entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk
of the Court of Appeals shall transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court within five days of the date of the entry of the order - -f
transfer.
(c) Liueria iui transfer. I he ( win I ul A|>|v;if, J ml I \ WMMIIU
only in the following rases

V I.

itifn.ilinii

(i) Cases which are of such a nature that it is apparent that the case shoulr V
decided by the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court would proha'M
grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case if decided h\ the (. < >ur oJ
Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals might rule, and
(_) L.asct> winv ii will gov* H I number oi other cases involving Uic same legal
issue or issues pending in the district courts, juvenile courts or the Court of
Appeals or which are cases of first impression under state or federal law
which will have wide applicability.

ADDENDUM 3

Utah Code Ann. §77-65-l(a)(b)
"...whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment
in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever
during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is
pending in this state any untried indictment, information or
complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within
ninety days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the
county attorney of the county in which the indictment,
information or complaint is pending and the appropriate court
written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request
for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information
or complaint....
(b) the written notice and request for final disposition referred to
in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to
the warden, sheriff or other official having custody of him, who
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the
appropriate county attorney and court by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested."

ADDENDUM 4

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be
granted — Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison,
jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and
the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted
any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.

ADDENDUM 5

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into
law -- Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered
into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the
form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
1. ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of
such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states
also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide
such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of Columbia;
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at
the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant to Article III
hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated
pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on an
indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV

hereof.
ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance
of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any
untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer
has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180
days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and
the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of
the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be
made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served,
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the
state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested.

(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on
which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all

untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of
the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and
courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's
request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by
the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be
accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the
certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint
contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of
imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same
with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the
receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for
final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in
order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance
with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent
the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the
request.
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment,
information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V

(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment,
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request
for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon
motion of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a)
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall
furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under
which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining
to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency
relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other
officers and appropriate courts in
the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for
custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or
his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner
of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint
contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment,
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the
court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary
custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever
custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into
whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the
request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged
is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment,
information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing
the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of
any force or effect.
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one
or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis
of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly

used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the
prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided
in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the
custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any escape
from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape
from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to
this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of
the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments,
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall
govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed
to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies
and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party
state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities
therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.

ARTICLE VII
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid,
the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to
any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby. If this agreement shall be held
contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and
effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
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FILED
Fourth judicid District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OREM CITY,

.^Z^l^LX^.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
V.

Case No. 011404844
Case No. 025402023

BRUCE JACKSON,
Defendants.

Assigned Judge: Derek P. Pullan
Division 10

These cases came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's
motion is based upon the failure of Plaintiff Orem City to bring the cases to trial within 120-days
of the date he delivered to the warden a written demand forfinaldisposition pursuant to section
77-29-1 of the Utah Code.
After oral argument, the Court ordered that both cases be dismissed with prejudice and
directed counsel for Defendant to preparefindingsof fact and conclusions of law. Counsel for
Defendant prepared and the prosecutor approved proposed writtenfindingsand conclusions
which werefiledwith the Court. After reviewing this document, the Court found that it contained
findings extraneous to the Court's decision and failed to convey fully the legal basis for that
decision. Therefore, the Court prepared this memorandum decision.
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Deputy

FINDINGS OF FACT
Orem City v. Bruce Jackson, Case Number 01144844
1.

On September 5, 2001, Orem Cityfiledan information charging Defendant Bruce Jackson
with driving on revocation, open container, andfivemisdemeanor counts of possession of
a controlled substance.

2.

Because district court judge in Orem recused himself, the case was transferred to the
Fourth District Court in Provo and assigned to Judge Lynn W. Davis.

3.

On January 23, 2002, the Court arraigned the Defendant and appointed the Orem City
Public Defender to represent him. The case was scheduled for pre-trial conference on
March 5, 2002.

4.

The parties appeared for the pre-trial conference and requested that the case be continued
for pretrial conference on April 19, 2002.

5.

On April 19, 2002, the Defendant failed to appear. The Court issued a warrant for
Defendant's arrest.

6.

Four months later, on or about August 19, 2002, the Defendant was arrested on the
warrant.
Orem City v. Bruce Jackson, Case No. 025402023

7.

On February 19, 2002, Orem Cityfiledan information charging the Defendant with
improper left/right turn, and driving on a revoked license.

8.

Because the district court judge in Orem recused himself, the case was transferred to the
Fourth District Court in Provo and Judge Lynn W. Davis was assigned.

9.

On February 25, 2002, the Court arraigned the Defendant.
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10.

On March 20, 2002, the Defendant failed to appear for further proceedings. The Court
issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest.

11.

Five months later, on or about August 19, 2002, the Defendant was arrested on the
warrant.
The Request for 120-Day Disposition

12.

On September 6, 2002, following his arrest on both warrants, the Defendant was
sentenced to prison in an unrelated matter.

13.

Three weeks later, the Defendant delivered to the warden a written demand for 120-day
disposition of untried charges pending against him.

14.

The written demand is dated September 25, 2002. However, the warden certified that it
was received on October 17, 2002. The form document consists of two pages and bears
the heading "Division of Institutional Operations Office Memorandum."

15.

The hand-written portion of this document identifies Orem City, Pleasant Grove City, and
Utah County as relevant prosecuting agencies. The crimes for which Defendant seeks
disposition are listed as "POSSESSION OF A CONTROLED SUBSTANCE, DRIVING
ON REVO, POSS. OF C/S. POSS. OF MA." [sic].

16.

The written demand references four case numbers. It does not list case number
011404844 or case number 025402023.

17.

The second page of the written demand provides that the Defendant is seeking final
disposition. It then states that "charges of possession of c/s #985040388 are now pending
against me in the Provo District Court brought by Utah County and request is hereby
made that you forward this notice to the appropriate authorities together with such
3

information as required by law."
18.

The warden notified the Utah County Attorney's Office by letter dated October 15, 2002
that the Defendant was requesting final disposition of "untried charges . . . pending in your
jurisdiction." This letter referenced all four case numbers listed in the written demand and
identified the crimes as "drive on revocation, poss of C/S 3 cts." [sic]. The letter was
copied to the Fourth District Court.

19.

The warden did not notify Orem City of the written demand for 120-day disposition of
pending charges filed by defendant.

20.

The first notice that Orem City had that the Defendant had been arrested on the
outstanding warrants was on July 22, 2003, the date both cases were scheduled for further
hearing.

21.

The 120-day period expired on February 14, 2003.

22.

The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code.

23.

The Court scheduled a hearing on this motion and trial for November 20, 2003.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code provides as follows:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail
or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against
the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner
shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any
appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120
days of the date of delivery of written notice.

Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(1). Once a written demand is delivered, the warden shall "immediately
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cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested,
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(2).
Unless good cause exists, the remedy for failure to bring the untried charges to trial within
the 120-day period is dismissal with prejudice. The statute provides:
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss
the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the courtfindsthat the failure
of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or
not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(4).
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to dismissal under this statute, the Court
applies a two-step analysis. First, the Court determines "when the 120-day period commenced
and when it expired." State v. Coleman, 34 P.3d 790, \ 6 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Second, "if the
trial was held outside the 120-day period, [the Court] must then determine whether 'good cause'
excused the delay." Id
In the instant case, the 120-day period commenced on October 17, 2002, the date the
warden certified receipt of Defendant's written demand forfinaldisposition. The 120-day period
expired on February 14, 2003. Trial was not scheduled until November 20, 2003, the date the
Court ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Orem City contends that the written demand was not legally sufficient because it did not
accurately identify all the pending charges. The Court rejects this argument. The statute requires
that the written demand specify "the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending."
Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1(1). The Defendant's written demand met these requirements.
5

The charges specified in the demand are driving on revocation and multiple counts of
possession of a controlled substance. Admittedly, in both pending cases, the demand identifies
some, but not all of the pending charges. However, section 77-29-1 does not require a precise list
of untried crimes. Rather, it requires that "the nature of the charge" be specified. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-1(1). For each case, Defendant identified the nature of Orem City's untried charges
with sufficient clarity to meet the requirements of the statute.
Orem City also argues that the written demand was without effect because it did not list
case numbers 011404844 and 025402023. Again, section 77-29-1(1) does not require such
precision. The demand in this case adequately identified the nature of the pending charges and
expressly listed Orem City as a prosecuting agency. The constitutional right to speedy trial ought
not to hinge upon a prisoner's knowledge of a nine-digit case number.
Because the trial was scheduled outside the 120-day period, the Court must determine
whether good cause excused this delay. Generally, a finding of good cause means "(1) delay
caused by the defendant—such as asking for a continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused
by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial." Coleman, 34 P.3d at 1f 6, quoting,
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1991). Neither of these circumstances are applicable
here. For this reason and those explained below, the Court concludes that good cause did not
excuse Orem City's delay in bringing these cases to trial.
Orem City argues that good cause existed because the City did not in any way contribute
to the warden's administrative error in failing to provide notice to the City prosecutor. The Court
rejects this contention. The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that the administrative error
of a court clerk did not excuse the prosecutor's duty to bring a defendant to trial within the 1206

day period. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998). Writing for a unanimous court,
Justice Russon wrote:
We first note that the judge's finding that the State did not contribute to the delay
carries little significance. The mere fact that the delay was not caused by the
prosecutor has never been dispositive because "to hold that good cause is
supported by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would
contradict the language in Section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecution.
Id, citing, State v. Wilson, 453 P.2d 158, 159-60 (Utah 1969).
The rights afforded a Defendant under section 77-29-1 would have little meaning if
administrative errors of the warden were an excuse for delay. A prisoner could make written
demand for final disposition of untried charges in strict accordance with all the requirements of
law, yet still be tried for those offense years later through no fault of his own. Such a ruling
would be inconsistent with the language of 77-29-1(4), and would seriously compromise the
constitutional right to speedy trial.
Finally, Orem City contends good cause exists because the Defendant failed to appear in
these cases and a bench warrant issued for his arrest. This event, combined with Defendant's later
commitment to prison, caused Orem City to be unaware of the Defendant's arrest. In effect,
Orem City argues that the 120-day period should commence from the date the City received
actual notice that the Defendant was in state custody. The Court finds this argument without
merit.
The plain language of section 77-29-1 provides that the a Defendant must be brought to
trial "within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice" to the warden. The written
demand delivered by the Defendant identified Orem City as a prosecuting agency. From the date
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the warden received it, Orem City had constructive knowledge of Defendant's arrest and
incarceration. The fact that the defendant failed to appear and was the subject of a bench warrant
prior to his incarceration at the prison is simply not relevant to the Court's decision.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss both cases with prejudice is
granted.
DATED this J ^ P d a y of February, 2004.
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